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3A B ST R ACT
The current crisis of Turkey’s foreign and security 
policy, and associated conflict resolution capability 
is to a considerable extent the result of the failure to 
accommodate the rivalry between the bureaucratic 
and societal-pluralist modes of policymaking. The 
rivalry and inability to institutionalize either mode 
has resulted in the political and institutional crises in 
foreign policy. The political crisis is the direct result of 
policy actors losing touch with, and to a certain extent 
disregarding, societal demands for policy making, 
utilizing a populist attitude in a way to reflect deep-
seated divisions and polarization in the country, as well 
as feeding into these divisions in order to extend one’s 
domestic hold on power. The institutional crisis has 
resulted from the sidelining of the bureaucracy, as well 
as its loss of agency in major issues, in the wake of state 
crisis and from continuous blows to the political class’ 
struggle against “bureaucratic tutelage” in Turkey. 
Against this backdrop, this paper traces the roots of the 
crisis, attempts to make sense of the twin institutional 
and political crises in foreign and security policy, and 
provides guidelines for the reform and reset of foreign/
security policy in Turkey.
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This study aims to analyze the growing anomalies 
in Turkish foreign and security policy (FSP) against 
the backdrop of state crisis in the aftermath of the 
July 2016 coup attempt. The historical-institutional 
background of the policy anomalies set the stage for 
the current derailment of Turkish foreign policy—from 
the lack of political consistency and state perspective 
to the eventual loss of a normative basis. FSP analysis 
requires an analytical framework or modeling focusing 
on multiple factors, i.e., ideas, actors, institutions, and 
engagement with goals, strategies, measures, direc-
tives, agreements, among others, within a multilevel 
discussion. This study will disclose two influential 
and determining models—bureaucratic-authoritarian 
tradition and societal-pluralist policymaking—as 
constitutive agents of historical development of FSP 
behavior in Turkey.
The historical evolution of Turkish foreign/security 
policy went hand-in-hand with a dialectical battle of 
ideas alongside institutionalized interests and attempts 
to harmonize with the emerging conjunctures in 
domestic landscapes and international environment. 
As the bureaucratic institutions and societal constel-
lations are the agents molding people’s behavior in 
policy making, the following quote by Marx can explain 
the transformation of foreign policy: “[M]en make 
history, but they do not make it under circumstances 
chosen by themselves, but under circumstances 
directly encountered, given and transmitted from the 
past.”1 The continuous inter-subjective formation and 
organization of foreign policy by the agents of opposing 
patterns of relationships “should be analyzed through 
identifying how contradictory relations between 
social agents are resolved, reconciled, or set aside.”2 
The dialectic reading of the historical development of 
FSP behavior does not rule out partial overlaps and 
convergences in the process, but posits that constitu-
tive elements clash with representations and practices 
of adversely inspired agents.
The current crisis of Turkey’s FSP is to a considerable 
extent the result of the failure of accommodating the 
rivalry between the bureaucratic and societal-pluralist 
modes of policymaking. The rivalry and inability to 
institutionalize either mode has resulted in political 
1 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Collected Works, Vol. XI (London: Law-
rence and Wishart, 1975). 
2 Benno Teschke and Can Cemgil, “The Dialectic of the Concrete: Recon-
sidering Dialectic for IR and Foreign Policy Analysis,” Globalizations 11, 
no. 5 (2014): 620.  
and institutional crises in foreign policy. The political 
crisis is the direct result of policy actors losing touch 
with, and to a certain extent disregarding, societal 
demands for policy making, utilizing a populist attitude 
in a way to reflect deep-seated divisions and polariza-
tion in the country, as well as feeding into these divi-
sions in order to extend one’s domestic hold on power. 
The institutional crisis has resulted from the sidelining 
of the bureaucracy, as well as its loss of agency in major 
issues, in the wake of state crisis and from continuous 
blows to the political class’ struggle against “bureau-
cratic tutelage” in Turkey. Against this backdrop, this 
paper will try to trace the roots of the crisis, make sense 
of the twin institutional and political crisis in FSP, and 
provide guidelines for reform and the reset of FSP in 
Turkey.
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Turkish foreign policy long carried the legacy of Ottoman 
modernization. The traumatic process of the dissolution 
of the Ottoman Empire gave rise to a defensive foreign 
policy outlook. The early Republican elite undertook the 
gargantuan task of nation-building in a post-imperial 
setting. While the Empire was melting on the warfront 
and at the post-war negotiating table, the late Ottoman 
intellectuals were discussing different ideas of West-
ernism, Islamism, Ottomanism, and Turkism. Thus, it 
was far from certain in the beginning that the ideational 
basis of the Republic would be Western. 3
The Republican elites’ intellectual transformation 
occurred under the demise of the Empire and the 
emergence of a nation-state in the Anatolian Turkish 
heartland, which was dictated by a new geographical 
and demographic necessity. Although Turkey’s new 
political elite had more room for maneuver in terms 
of their ideological choices and preferences of govern-
ment, these choices and preferences were made under 
the conditions of intellectual transformation to a new 
post-Ottoman mind. This new mindset was appre-
hensive and defensive, with serious concerns for the 
survival of the new nation-state.
Falih Rifki Atay’s autobiography, Zeytindağı4 (Mount 
of Olives), is a good example for understanding how 
the new Turkish elite interpreted the past and what 
they expected from the future. Atay, who served as 
the chief of staff to Cemal Pasa, the commander of 
Palestine and Syria in the Eastern front during the 
First World War, considered the Ottoman presence 
outside Anatolia, particularly in the Middle East, as a 
useless endeavor and waste of resources. He referred 
to the devastating situation in Anatolia and held the 
Ottoman Empire responsible for its deterioration. He 
blamed the Ottoman administration for spending the 
precious human and material resources of Anatolia in 
the Arabian lands in vain. In accord, Turkey’s new intel-
lectual mind chose to defy the imperial legacy and opted 
for the Western model of government and secularism as 
appropriate for the country’s future. In other words, 
this new project was based on actively forgetting—if not 
denigrating5—Turkey’s Ottoman and Islamic past.
3 This part relies on a former study of the author, see Bülent Aras, “Turkey’s 
Rise in the Greater Middle East: Peace-Building in the Periphery,” Jour-
nal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 11, no. 1 (2009): 29–41.
4 Falih Rıfkı Atay, Zeytindağı (İstanbul: Can Yayınları, 1980). 
5 Selim Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitima-
tion of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909 (London, New York: I.B. 
Tauris, 1998), 1.
Yet, the Republican elite in some ways also symbolized 
a continuation of the Ottoman bureaucratic tradition, 
particularly in FSP.6 The most predominant Ottoman 
legacy was perhaps that a selective group of bureaucrats 
determined the contours of foreign policy, national 
interests, and foreign policy identity. In the beginning 
elitism was born out of necessity due to the post-war 
devastation of the country and the prerogatives of 
nation-building. However, the bureaucratic mandate 
has been perpetuated in later stages with a security-
first outlook and bloc mentality during the Cold War. 
Despite Turkey’s attempted steps toward democratiza-
tion, the Turkish foreign policy establishment found 
ways to reserve foreign and security policy-making for 
bureaucratic cadres and, more often than not, cordoned 
it off from public debate under the pretext of “national 
security.” Thus, Turkish foreign policy has also been 
viewed as an instrument of endorsement of Turkey’s 
Western identity, and Turkey’s foreign policy choices 
have aptly reflected this ideological orientation. 
The international system played an important role in 
shaping the political and ideological choices of Turkey 
and its foreign policy. The Western prevalence in 
Ottoman lands after the First World War had a conse-
quential impact on the founding father’s decision to 
establish a nation-state with a secular and nationalist 
character. The end of the Second World War and the 
creation of the UN system had a similar impact on 
the transition to a multi-party system and democra-
tization. Turkey’s preferences reflected the conscious 
decision to harmonize with the prevalent international 
order. However, Turkey’s inclination toward the West’s 
foreign policy was reflected in domestic politics through 
a sort of filtering mechanism. While elites clamored for 
increased modernization and Westernization so as to 
elevate Turkey to the economic level of the civilized 
world, at the same time Turkish identity at home also 
reflected the distrust and latent enmity towards the 
West inherited from the Ottoman administrative elite.7 
6 See, Roderic H. Davison, “Ottoman diplomacy and its legacy,” in Imperial 
Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East, ed. L. C. 
Brown (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 172–199.
7 Orhan Koçak, “‘Westernisation Against the West’: Cultural Politics in the 
Early Turkish Republic,” in Turkey’s Engagement with Modernity: Conflict 
and Change in the Twentieth Century, eds. Celia Kerslake, Kerem Öktem, 
and Philip Robins (Basingstoke, England; New York; Oxford: Palgrave 
Macmillan, in association with St Antony’s College, 2010), 305–322.
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“Peace at Home, Peace in the World”—the guiding 
Ataturkist principle in Turkish foreign policy—has 
long been a rally cry to underscore Turkey’s need for 
domestic consolidation and staying away from “foreign 
adventures.” The establishment media and intellec-
tuals of statecraft hewed closely to the ideological posi-
tions of the foreign policy elite, constantly struggling 
to legitimize the regime’s stance. After 1945, Turkey’s 
cautious policy matched the Cold War straitjacket of 
Western identity. Security concerns thus trumped the 
European case for democratic pluralism and extension 
of the human rights regime. In any case, Turkey was 
more comfortable in its relations with the United State, 
which did not question Turkey’s domestic political 
environment after the Second World War.
Turkey’s post-Ottoman state and foreign policy iden-
tity required an inward-looking and defensive approach 
to international relations. On occasion, Turkey showed 
considerable audacity in its foreign policy. However, 
Turkish foreign policy has been also shaped by the 
constraints of “Sevres Syndrome,” a mentality directly 
related to its transformation from an Empire into a 
nation-state. It refers to the repercussions of the still-
born Treaty of Sevres, which outlined further partition 
of the Ottoman Empire by foreign powers and their 
proxies in Ottoman territories after the First World 
War. Reflexively, it imbues the apprehension that the 
country is surrounded by enemies and constantly 
faces “foreign designs” for break-up or partition. This 
distinctively rejectionist view of the world still plays a 
vital role in shaping the minds of Turkish policymakers.
Turkey’s FSP has been largely determined by domestic 
political priorities. The Kurdish and Islamist rebellions 
during the establishment period gave the founding 
fathers of the Republic an opportunity to silence the 
opposition. The threats of Kurdish separatism and 
Islamist rebellion shaped the cognitive map of the 
security elite and contributed to the creation of an 
exclusive political culture whereby serious opposition 
to government policies or comprehensive disagree-
ment with their progress laid open the possibility that 
the disaffected groups would be labeled as traitors. 
Conducting foreign policy in line with a security-first 
outlook was in conformity with the growing role of 
the military in foreign policy formulation. In the end, 
ideological narrowing in domestic politics caused 
foreign policy to be strict, less sensitive to change, and 
less flexible in regional policies.
Turkey’s FSP identity has been shaped by the bureau-
cratic-authoritarian paradigm, which was overwhelm-
ingly wrought by the state’s security concerns. While 
it has proven an asset in state building and regime 
consolidation in early stages, later on the “security-
first” outlook limited Turkish foreign policy’s ability 
to minimize conflicts, seek common ground, and 
develop alternative coalitions and alliances. During 
the Cold War, the bloc mentality and the straitjacket 
of the NATO alliance masked the latter deficits. Yet, 
the end of the Cold War and rising ethnic and cultural 
conflicts unraveled Turkey’s ability to both stick to the 
terms of this insular worldview and project influence 
on conflicts directly affecting Turkey’s multicultural 
population. Such was the case in Bosnia, Bulgaria, 
Kosovo, and Iraq.
With the removal of strong barriers between the 
domestic and international spheres in the post-Cold 
War era, one could make a strong case that Turkish 
foreign policy gradually slipped out of the control of 
the nationalist elite with the rising influence of societal 
demands in policy making. In the early 21st century, the 
key to understanding Turkish politics was to examine 
the tension between globalist and nationalist perspec-
tives on domestic and international politics. There 
was an emerging literature arguing that the future of 
Turkish politics will be heavily influenced by globalist 
demands and, subsequently, Turkish foreign policy.8 
A number of foreign policy issues in this period, e.g., 
the first and second Gulf Wars in Iraq, the Palestinian 
question, and independence of Turkic Central Asian 
states, presented some unusual deviations from the 
traditional bureaucratic-authoritarian FSP stances. 
Foreign policy behavior, among others, is ideally shaped 
by the norms existing within the relevant society. These 
values arise out of common historical experiences and 
become widespread over time, coming to be seen as 
natural developments, making them most difficult 
to change. These values-norms can have significant 
effects on the formulation of a nation’s foreign policy. 
When the values widely held by society conflict with the 
views of expert foreign policy-makers in a polity, social 
values-norms may tend to outweigh expert opinion 
on FSP in a pluralist political atmosphere. In reverse, 
Turkish policy-makers have for a long time adopted a 
bureaucratic-authoritarian tradition of policy making, 
hampering the way in which social values must be 
taken into consideration in the development of foreign 
policy. In this period, a considerable section of Turkish 
society had expressed its support for globalist-demo-
8 See, Ziya Öniş, “Conservative Globalists versus Defensive Nationalists: 
Political Parties and Paradoxes of Europeanization in Turkey,” Journal of 
Southern Europe and the Balkans 9, no. 4 (2007): 247–261; Bülent Aras, 
“Turkish Foreign Policy and Jerusalem: Towards a Societal Construction 
of Foreign Policy,” Arab Studies Quarterly 23, no. 4 (2000): 31–59.
7cratic demands and expected policy-makers to guide 
the development of FSP according to the values of the 
people. This demand was also in accord with the post-
Cold War international normative order, which was 
increasingly imbued with democratic norms, values, 
and principles. 
Democratization and de-securitization in the early 
phase of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) 
rule changed the inside/outside matrix to include more 
societal input in the processes of formulating FSP.9 In 
this period, Turkey’s bid for EU membership was at 
the center of domestic changes. In order to prepare for 
EU accession, Turkey undertook considerable legal, 
political, and economic reforms. A significant segment 
of Turkey’s bureaucrats, politicians, and citizens joined 
in on the consensus to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria 
for EU membership and tolerated the pain of the IMF-
directed structural adjustment programs.10 Societal 
forces increased their influence in policymaking and 
competed against the old bureaucratic–authoritarian 
tradition. At the same time, foreign policy-makers 
were paying more attention to international legiti-
macy, values, and norms. The significance of Turkey’s 
domestic transformation was the consolidation of 
stability in the country, enabling it to emerge as a 
peace-promoter in neighboring regions. The changes 
moved a number of former security issues off the 
political agenda.
This new imagination placed different assumptions 
about regional countries in the minds of policy-makers. 
The territorial limits to Turkish involvement in neigh-
boring countries disappeared in this new mindset. The 
relationship between “bordering and othering”11 lost its 
meaning after removing the strains of domestic threat 
perceptions in regional policy. The resultant novel 
practices of power have sealed the fate of a number 
of evolving trends in FSP, which have actually been 
unfolding since the end of the Cold War yet resisted 
change until recently due to the overriding role of the 
military bureaucracy. In due course, but particularly 
after the failed July 2016 coup and subsequent state 
crisis, traditional actors such as the Armed Forces, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and National Security 
9 Bülent Aras and R. Karakaya Polat, “Turkey and the Middle East: Fron-
tiers of the New Geographic Imagination,” Australian Journal of Interna-
tional Affairs 61, no. 4 (2007): 471–488.
10 Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, “The Evolution of the National Security Culture 
and the Military in Turkey,” International Affairs 54, no. 1 (Fall 2000): 
199–216; Ersel Aydınlı, Nihat Ali Özcan, and Doğan Akyaz, “The Turkish 
Military’s March toward Europe,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 1 (January–Feb-
ruary 2006): 77–90.
11 Henk V. Houtum, “The Geopolitics of Borders and Boundaries,” Geopoli-
tics 10, no. 4 (2005): 674.
Council have turned into non-players and effectively 
bookkeepers. In addition, the idea that foreign policy 
was more or less about bipartisan national interests has 
given way to a partisan realm of victories and inevitably 
losses.
The quest for grandeur in Turkey’s broader neigh-
borhood won popular applause but largely failed to 
earn the consent of bureaucratic cadres, which were 
forced out of their comfort zone and into the ever-
conflicting environment in Turkey’s neighborhood.12 
The Turkish bureaucracy was ill-equipped to provide 
an expansionist or even a more conciliatory soft power 
role beyond its traditionalist concerns for security 
and stability.13 In that sense, the so-called “Davutoğlu 
era”14 in Turkish foreign policy represented political 
overreach and paved the way for undermining the role 
of the bureaucracy, if only through demonstrating its 
unreadiness for a more active role. Overall, the transi-
tional deficiency has had ideational and institutional 
components. Ideationally, Turkey failed to establish a 
new foreign/security policy ethos among its bureau-
cratic cadres in accordance with its changing policy 
goals, which sought a regional leadership role and 
global harmony with major centers of power such as 
the United States, EU, Russia, and China. Institution-
ally, the present setup has proven both uncommitted 
and deficient in leading a change from a more comfort-
able “security-first” outlook towards a laborious exten-
sion of the Turkish zone of influence. Lacking lingual 
and professional skills as well as reluctant to promote 
Turkish expansionism, the Turkish bureaucracy 
confined themselves to propagating the validity of 
traditional goals of “non-intervention” and following 
Atay’s bitter experience for “staying away from the 
Arab swamp.”15
12 Bülent Aras, “Reform and Capacity Building in the Turkish Foreign Min-
istry: Bridging the Gap between Ideas and Institutions,” Journal of Balkan 
and Near Eastern Studies 17, no. 3 (2015): 269–286.
13 Interview with a bureaucrat in correspondence with the author, Ankara, 
December 21, 2016.
14 Bülent Aras, “Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy,” SETA Policy Brief 
32 (Ankara: SETA, 2009).
15 Mensur Akgün, “Ortadoğu Bataklığı,” Star, June 22, 2014, accessed 
January 24, 2018, http://www.star.com.tr/yazar/ortadogu-batakligi-ya-
zi-899209/.
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The central factor begetting the current inability to 
cope with multiple crises has been the timing of the 
regional and global disorder, which weighed on top of 
the unfinished domestic political transition in Turkey. 
The latter had to do with the liberalization and in a way 
civilianization of the Turkish political regime, which 
still carried the imprint of the 1930s single-party era 
and successive military coups afterwards. To overcome 
the government-bureaucracy dichotomy, the conserva-
tive AK Party espoused a flag-bearer role to liberalize 
the constitutional order and rollback the military 
bureaucracy’s predominant role. The subsequent 
flow of events has disproven this idealistic projection 
of “liberal transition” as Turkey had to settle for fake 
court cases; illegal buildup of alternative levers of 
power, especially in the bureaucracy; and eventually a 
coup attempt, which brought the state apparatus virtu-
ally to the breaking point. Even though the coup was 
averted, the turn of events ever since points to further 
polarization, recriminations, and zero-sum logic rather 
than expanding consensual politics to gather around 
common principles.
In fact, the transition has proven more difficult than 
expected and undermined the earlier assumption that 
Turkey could lead the move towards change16 (and 
is rather than be menaced by change) particularly in 
regional dynamics. The underlying domestic factors 
that inhibited a smooth transition have been the 
secular-Islamist, Sunni-Alevi, and Turkish-Kurdish 
cleavages on top of the statist outlook that defied 
peripheral demands for political representation. The 
statist worldview has also undermined the Turkish 
ability to introduce flexible foreign policy formulas 
against regional and global upheaval. It is now apparent 
that the pluralist (and also multiculturalist) attempt to 
transcend the traditional foreign policy of status quoism 
largely hit a wall in zeroing out regional confrontation. 
Yet, its failure also unwound the preliminary attempts 
to reset TFP with a proactive approach against growing 
upheavals. Thus, Turkey ended up with a prevalent 
domestic focus that hampered Turkey’s regional and 
global alliances and possible coalition-making vis-à-vis 
foreign conflicts.
16 “Davutoğlu: Ortadoğu’da Değişim Dalgasını Yöneteceğiz,” Cumhuriyet, 
April 26, 2012, accessed January 24, 2018, http://www.cumhuriyet.com.
tr/haber/diger/337928/_Ortadogu_daki_degisim_dalgasini_yonetec-
egiz_.html. 
With the derailment of the transitional phase to a 
democratic-pluralist paradigm, especially with the 
advent of the Arab revolts in 2011, Turkish FSP has 
entered a new cycle of crises, shaking its foundational 
premises of Western orientation and status quoism 
yet failing to place alternative pillars for stability and 
continuity. Facing the destructive forces of domestic 
instability, geostrategic rivalry, and flux in regional and 
international security order, the ability to steer clear 
definitely now more than ever entails a redefinition 
of goals, interests, and above all institutional reform 
to address complex challenges. The current reactive 
mode rather reflects a growing mismanagement and 
inability to respond with effective and sustainable 
policy formulas. In any case, the problem is broader 
than policymaking solutions and points to the 
structural and institutional deficit in coping with the 
unprecedented mix of challenges.
Against the current predicament in Turkish foreign 
policy, the inability to perpetuate the societal-pluralist 
foreign policy paradigm and the failure in adapting 
the institutional setup to changing dynamics have 
dialectically given way to an aspiration to return to 
the good old days of traditionalism. Multiple security 
challenges at home and abroad, the continuing erosion 
of Turkish regional goals, and even worse, Turkey’s 
isolation from both the Western alliance and regional 
dynamics set the stage for a comeback of the Turkish 
Republic’s traditional policy agenda of “security-first.” 
Yet, Turkey today faces a complex mix of multilayered 
and multivectoral domestic, regional, and global 
challenges. Therefore, the ideal of reset, which goes 
beyond the recent debates of recalibration,17 has to 
take into account the intermingling of conflicts on 
multiple, overlapping levels. This background makes it 
obligatory for Turkish policymakers to broaden their 
predominantly domestic focus and rather come to 
terms with the need for a reset in TFP.
Turkey against multilevel challenges
The primary casualty of the failure of the democratic 
transition in Turkey has been domestic stability. In 
the beginning of the decade, Turkey had grasped the 
chance to democratize and liberalize its constitutional 
order, while the traditional forces of authoritarianism 
were placed on the back burner. However, the histor-
ical chance was misspent to corner and minimize the 
17 See, Bülent Aras, “Turkish Foreign Policy after July 15,” IPC Policy Report 
(Istanbul: Istanbul Policy Center, February 2017).
9opposition, expand the AK Party’s hegemony over the 
political arena, and arguably “inadvertently” empower 
the Gülenists—followers of self-exiled Islamic cleric 
Fethullah Gülen, who is alleged to have mastermind 
the July 2016 coup attempt—to claim overarching 
bureaucratic power. The so-called Kurdish “peace 
(resolution) process” with the Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party (PKK) also failed to realize its ultimate aim of 
reconciliation as it turned into a tool of politicking by 
both sides. On top of these, the succession crisis within 
the AK Party also eroded the democratic credentials of 
the government as the party espoused growing adher-
ence to the cult of personality rather than an ideal of 
evolution to post-Erdoğan politics.
The end results of these failures were eventual political 
instability and erosion of state authority. In that sense, 
the July coup was a corollary not a sudden flare. Yet, its 
aftermath has proven detrimental to earlier Turkish 
goals of democratic transition and regional leadership. 
The rally around the flag effect after the coup attempt, 
namely “the Yenikapı spirit,” which was able to bring 
together all mainstream political parties in support 
of the constitutional order, was shortly eclipsed by 
partisan considerations. The AK Party’s unwavering 
commitment to supposedly reinvigorate the executive 
organ through a “Turkish type” presidential system 
undid the remaining bits of consensual politics in 
Turkey. Having the nationalist party leader Devlet 
Bahceli on board for this cause seemed to have missed 
the designed objective of a grand nationalist-conserv-
ative coalition. Rather, what has emerged has been 
further fragmentation and polarization in Turkish 
politics, whereby not only the nationalist party was 
split into two, but also the AK Party had to enforce self-
harming party discipline to silence opposition among 
its ranks. Neither the referendum of April 16, 2017 nor 
the looming elections on the horizon offers feasible 
prospects for restoring democratic norms of account-
ability, transparency, and more importantly across the 
board, respect for the electoral mandate for ruling the 
country. The resultant political instability has in turn 
undermined the Turkish ability to play up to its poten-
tial role as a power broker in regional geopolitics.
Turkey’s geopolitics is both its most formidable asset 
and biggest liability. While it assigns Turkey a role 
broader than its political and economic capacity, it also 
overburdens its capacity to cope with complex conflicts. 
For example, the Arab Spring overturned the Turkish 
role to interconnect the West and Islamic Middle East. 
Turkey faced the possibility of severing its ideational 
link to both worlds, which set the stage for a reincarna-
tion of Turkey’s historical isolationist complex. Unable 
to lead change, especially in neighboring Syria, Turkish 
security concerns were elevated with the expansion of 
the twin threats of PKK separatism and Islamic State 
jihadism. Worse still, Turkey lost common ground with 
Arab partners, with the minor exception of Qatar, upon 
a major discord on the role of the Muslim Brotherhood 
in Arab politics, which left Turkish pro-Sunni tenden-
cies void of major support. Turkish fixation on the 
overthrow of Egyptian President Morsi and the rejec-
tion of his successor, President Sisi, pushed the door 
wide open for anti-Turkish coalitions between Egypt, 
Greece, Cyprus, and—with a veiled role from behind 
the scenes—Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean.18 The 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) and to a lesser extent 
Saudi Arabia also occasionally volunteered to disrupt 
Turkish interests.19
Against this backdrop, Turkish security concerns came 
to trump regional policy goals, i.e., support for like-
minded regimes, with a single focus on confronting 
the PKK’s expansionism in Syria and Iraq. This lately 
brought Turkey and Iran together against Kurdish aspi-
rations, particularly in Iraq. It also pushed Turkey to 
Russia’s orbit to gain a free hand against PKK offshoots 
under the pretext of Syrian territorial integrity. Thus, 
Turkey seemed to have narrowed its external focus 
in order to extend its major domestic goal of fighting 
against PKK terrorism.
Beyond the flux in international dynamics, especially 
with the loss of direction in U.S. politics and the EU as 
well as the growing confidence of rising great powers 
such as China and Russia, Turkey appeared desperate 
to seek international support for regime consolidation 
after the coup attempt. This exclusively domestic focus 
hindered a possible Turkish role in meeting its security 
interests and balancing Western ties with broader 
global engagement. Turkey could have overcome a 
legitimate but narrow preoccupation with the PKK to 
lead the broader fight against terrorism in Syria and 
Iraq, which would have strengthened its hand in global 
equations. Rather, Turkey turned itself into a rejec-
tionist power opposing the Russian and Iranian alliance 
with Assad, the American alliance with the Democratic 
Union Party (PYD), the Kurdistan Regional Govern-
ment (KRG)’s independence referendum in Iraq, 
and Arab-Israeli coalition against Iran. Thus, Turkey 
18 Aya Samir, “Egypt, Greece, Cyprus: Model for Successful Internation-
al Cooperation,” Egypt Today, November 21, 2017 accessed January 24, 
2018, https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/2/33551/Egypt-Greece-Cy-
prus-Model-for-successful-international-cooperation.
19 Mehmet Solmaz, “Why Saudi Arabia and the UAE are Targeting Turkey,” 
Middle East Eye, December 27, 2017, accessed January 24, 2018, http://
www.middleeasteye.net/columns/why-uae-hostile-turkey-1184696487.
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pushed itself to the sidelines and ultimately did a great 
disservice to its national interests.
The coup attempt and the explicit role played by 
the Gülenists also undermined Turkey’s relations 
particularly with Western and regional partners. 
Turkey unleashed a helter-skelter plan to erase the 
Gülenist outreach (schools and financial links) from 
Central Asia to Africa, the Balkans, and Western 
countries, especially after the coup attempt. Unable 
to receive international support in return, Turkey felt 
even more isolated. Meanwhile, the Gülenists found a 
receptive audience, particularly in the United States 
and Germany, to diffuse their anti-government and 
increasingly anti-Turkish views. In return, the Turkish 
government espoused anti-American and anti-Western 
rhetoric to consolidate its electoral base and win over 
the nationalists across the board. 
This overall picture seemed to give leeway to resusci-
tation of the bureaucratic-authoritarian tradition in 
Turkish foreign policy albeit in a renewed form. In the 
new era, Turkey is a major advocate of non-interven-
tion in third countries’ domestic affairs and territo-
rial integrity of neighboring states as well as a vocal 
opponent of Western intervention in regional affairs. 
This resuscitated traditional model of status quoism 
absent Western orientation automatically assigns the 
security cadres a prevalent role in policymaking and 
implementation. The AK Party government visibly 
co-opted the military and intelligence apparatus in its 
quest for damage control. Thus, Syria and Iraq again 
became realms of securitized foreign policy. Civilian 
and academic input has largely been absent. Even insti-
tutional feedback from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
was lacking due both to the growing influence of the 
presidential team on foreign policy and the Ministry’s 
eroding human capacity after the purges. 
To overcome this vicious circle of conflicts aggravated 
by eroding institutional capacity and to cope with 
multiple challenges beyond the use of military-security 
tools, working on civilian institutional capacity is 
a no-brainer. Of course, domestic consolidation is 
a governmental priority, and political transition 
would still trump all other concerns. Yet in any case, 
a reinvigorated institutional setup, new thinking, and 
multidisciplinary approach could pay off. Emphasis 
on diplomacy and better representation could open up 
new venues for explaining and finding an regional and 
international audience for legitimate Turkish interests. 
The ability to insert Turkey’s interests either through 
public diplomacy or behind closed doors would 
motivate qualified public servants to engage more in 
policymaking and implementation. Again, Turkey’s 
return to international diplomacy as a responsible and 
respectable actor would better serve its interests both 
politically and economically.
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The need for reform in FSP mainly stems from the loss 
of guiding principles in organization and formulating 
policy. Credibility entails upholding the principle of 
continuity in state affairs. Bureaucracy’s ideally long-
term vision is supposed to keep track of state records 
and pursue national interests. Their network with both 
national and international interlocutors shapes policy-
making and makes sure different stakes are taken into 
consideration. Yet, the undeclared struggle between 
the bureaucracy and government elites has endangered 
this assumed long-term vision and dilapidated the 
bureaucracy’s ability to steer an autonomous course 
even if acting under the government’s ruling mandate. 
The dialectical dynamics of assigning the bureaucracy 
either an all-in or minimized role disrupted the state 
apparatus’s ability to sustain the so-called “state 
memory,” which has again run the risk of alienating 
partners and emboldening adversaries. 
Indisputably, the agents of foreign and security poli-
cymaking are in dire need of reform. The Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs lost its traditional role and failed 
to produce a working ethos to catch up with the 
political changes in Ankara and beyond. The military 
suffered large-scale purges and lost its interest in its 
traditional claim to get actively involved in policy-
making. Academia, like civil society, is bleeding due 
to large-scale purges and infringements on academic 
independence. The resultant void impoverished the 
current style of overarching personal policymaking 
from institutional feedback. Moreover, following 
the uncertainties of constitutional transition and 
the resultant deficiency of a practical understanding 
of the government-bureaucracy relationship, the 
bureaucracy has automatically been excluded from the 
policymaking process. Last but not least, the foreign 
and security institutions have had to struggle against 
burgeoning personnel and resource deficits, which also 
demoralized the bureaucracy and eroded its founding 
ethos as a servant of the nation.
Against these setbacks, a three-pronged set of meas-
ures should be put in place. First, meritocracy and 
the bureaucratic ethos to serve the nation should 
be revitalized. The gargantuan task to employ new 
bureaucratic cadres is, however, both a chance and a 
potential menace. Provided that the political authority 
avails this opportunity to seek efficiency and long-
term commitment, Turkey still has qualified public 
officials such as career professionals and a young and 
educated pool of personnel to compensate for the 
purges. However, if partisan considerations prevail, 
the state crisis would be prolonged with damaging 
repercussions on state performance. Second, at a time 
of economic bottlenecks, more efficient use of avail-
able resources is obligatory. Prioritization rather than 
quantitative expansion in public service—such as the 
goal of maximizing the number of diplomatic missions 
across the globe—would serve Turkish interests better. 
Providing additional resources, fringe benefits, and 
above all, giving actors a stake in policymaking could 
be employed to better motivate the current cadres. 
Third, the government should lose no time to set up 
the legal framework for the government-bureaucracy 
relationship. The current uncertainty only breeds 
future uncertainty and leads to further stalling tactics 
on the part of the bureaucracy. The latter needs a road 
map, confidence, and applicable rules and procedures 
to implement and keep track of governmental policies.
Government circles might think that inconsistency is 
an asset against uncontrollable instability both at home 
and abroad. It might also serve to confuse the elec-
torate to avert attention from burgeoning political and 
economic problems. It could even be thought to work 
toward derailing a reasonable government-opposition 
debate, which again supposedly gives the government 
an upper hand with its prevalent control of media and 
messaging outlets in Turkey.
These largely domestic goals, however, mar Turkish 
interests and the ability to gain international support 
for foreign policy goals. Each and every day, an internal 
debate in Turkey reaches an international audience 
either on social media or specific national channels, 
which at best engenders mockery or worse plays into 
anti-Turkish feelings.20 The government’s overzealous 
attention to these negative sentiments agitates the 
domestic electorate and enhances feelings of external 
deceit and animosity between Turks and the outside 
world, which is further aggravated by personalized use 
of social media to attract attention. When a tweet or 
retweet pops up in any corner of the world about Turkey 
or Turkish history, it immediately enters the national 
agenda, and the response it gets from government 
20 For example see, Alan Yuhas, “So Muslims Beat Columbus to America? 
They Have Better Get in Line,” The Guardian, November 17, 2014, ac-
cessed January 24, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/
nov/17/muslims-beat-columbus-america-better-get-in-line.
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circles turns into a bilateral or multilateral debate.21 
The pro-government media also plays a leading role in 
further alienating foreign partners in a similar fashion.
Beyond public diplomacy setbacks, FSP is visibly 
losing overall consistency. Turkey’s foreign relations 
have become more about short-term ups and downs 
rather than long-term alignments. To exemplify, the 
recent rapprochement with Russia was preceded by 
testing the limits of confrontation after the downing of 
the Russian jet. A poor grasp of the Trump presidency 
early on gave way to a shame and blame game from 
single issues such as Jerusalem and the U.S. backing 
of the PYD in Syria to particular court cases in the U.S. 
against the Turkish banking system. Early hopes about 
King Salman’s rule in Saudi Arabia were overturned by 
opposition to Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman’s 
pro-Israeli and anti-Iranian stance. Relations with 
Iran, Greece, Iraq, Germany, Bulgaria, Egypt, and 
Israel have seen pragmatic cooperation in certain 
fields overshadowed by an ideological reproach for 
divergences in foreign policy. A critical volte-face was 
also experienced with the KRG in Iraq, which devolved 
from a major regional ally to assumed national security 
threat and came virtually under Turkish containment. 
In addition to oscillations in bilateral ties, Turkey’s 
Western orientation has lost its core meaning even if 
Turkey is still a member of distinctive Western clubs, 
above all NATO, the OECD, and the Council of Europe. 
Anti-Western rhetoric, which boomed after July 15, 
shows signs of becoming a structural discourse beyond 
an instrument of domestic politics. “Anti-imperialism” 
(read anti-Americanism) has become a catchword 
among government and opposition circles. While there 
is still an implicit expectation of rapprochement with 
Western countries, which is expectedly more about 
the West showing empathy for Turkey against growing 
challenges,22 daily developments certainly shut the 
door for any potential opening. Even if relations with 
both the EU and the U.S. still trump all others economi-
cally and culturally, Turkey has been losing touch with 
Western capitals and undoubtedly lost many friends in 
the West.
21 The most recent example has been a retweet of the UAE Foreign Minis-
ter. See, “Turkey Denounces UAE Over Divisive ‘Propaganda’ Retweet,” 
Al Jazeera, December 17, 2017, accessed January 24, 2018, http://www.
aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/turkey-denounces-uae-divisive-propagan-
da-retweet-171219192504147.html.
22 This issue has actually turned into a chicken-and-egg question on wheth-
er Turkey is misunderstood by the West or if Turkey is unable to explain 
itself. A better way of approaching the issue would be to reframe Turk-
ish-Western relations not as an idea (“friends support each other whatso-
ever”) but in terms of norms and interests.
On that note, restoring policy consistency with insti-
tutional feedback would be a crucial step towards 
restoring Turkish credibility vis-à-vis international 
interlocutors. To that end, Turkish policymakers 
need to make a goals-capability analysis and better 
seek conformity of Turkish regional and international 
goals with capacity to cope with multiple challenges. 
Admittedly, this has become a harder task given the 
erosion of expertise and staff in the public sector on top 
of the security and transitional challenges mentioned 
above. Yet, Turkey has to rethink its relationship 
with Western allies and seek common ground against 
shared challenges, above all terrorism, geopolitics, and 
the incessant refugee flow. Unless Turkey reinvigor-
ates its Western ties, the possibility of reaching its 
national goals of security and prosperity and improving 
its ability to co-opt regional hegemons such as Russia 
and Iran in support of Turkish interests will diminish. 
There is no perfect model Turkey may match in order 
to achieve its goals; but, the history of Turkish FSP is 
an enlightening guide, i.e., Turkey must balance ties 
between Western and regional countries.
Setting achievable goals in regional policy is a necessity 
in Turkish foreign policy, however humbling. Turkey 
has to acknowledge that the benevolent conjuncture 
early in the decade toward the rise of Turkish clout has 
simply slipped away. Rather, Turkey exists in a world of 
risks and challenges that entail the utmost caution for 
conflict resolution. Therefore, Turkey should espouse 
a cautious but active “balancer” role, not an awkward 
pretense of leadership. To that end, Turkey should 
expand its efforts toward coalition building in order to 
secure the territorial integrity of Syria and Iraq, engage 
in post-ISIS reintegration of Sunni demographics, and 
isolate the root causes of terrorism, i.e., disenfran-
chisement, sectarianism, and extremism. This, again, 
entails being open to dialogue with both worlds, i.e., 
pro- and anti-Iranian fronts. The current tilt towards 
the Iranian-Russian alliance risks alienating the anti-
Iranian coalition and Western support for Turkish 
goals. Again, Turkish intrusion in intra-Arab conflicts 
in the Gulf would undermine the need for sustainable 
regional engagement. The Western orientation also 
needs a boost, which will not come on a golden plate 
in the form of EU accession or total U.S. support for 
Turkish security goals. Rather, Turkey should absorb 
the changing character of international relations 
based on transactional cooperation without missing 
the broader goals of normative harmonization with 
Western countries, which would expand the possibility 
of cooperation.
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The framework for cooperative engagement could 
only be set in rethinking the vulnerable policy of 
“security first,” which gives Turkey’s international 
interlocutors the upper hand in defining relations. This 
has particularly been the case with Russia, especially 
after the reconciliation process. Russia appears to have 
played its hand well in order to have Turkey on board 
for securing the Assad regime in Syria in return for its 
dubious and questionably marginal role in northern 
Syria. The Turkish eschewing of its case for a pluralist 
Syria not only undermines its credibility but also its 
ability to project power in regional equations. The 
emboldened Russian presence neighboring Turkey 
complicates Turkish security and blocks its direct 
access to the Arab and rapidly developing Kurdish 
geopolitics in the region. Overreliance on the Russian 
security design defies a perennial Turkish goal for 
keeping great powers away from its borders.
The security-dominant outlook has also undermined 
the Turkish ability to co-opt Western allies in support 
of its regional goals. The derailment of the so-called 
Arab Spring from its initial aspiration for “liberaliza-
tion” certainly played its part in the eventual diver-
gence between Turkey and the West. While street 
protests gave way to sectarian and extremist causes, 
the Turkish ability to stand together with Western 
allies proved unsustainable. First was the Western 
(American) reticence to shoulder the burden of yet 
another “quagmire.” Second was the uncertainty about 
the prospects of “liberalization,” i.e., whether it would 
give leeway to overarching Islamization. However, 
Turkey also failed to demonstrate consistent policy in 
supporting democratization and liberalization rather 
than centering on first geostrategic rivalry and then 
fighting against the PKK. The latter particularly had 
been a setback in maintaining a cooperative tone with 
the West at a time when the Western world was locked 
into the fight against ISIS. The PKK rather shrewdly 
turned itself into a cooperative proxy of the West. This 
dissonance, in turn, not only handicapped Turkish 
security goals but also eroded remaining common 
ground with the West to the detriment of Turkish clout 
in regional equations.
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C O N C LUS I O N
Overall, the complexity of challenges of the twin crises 
of bureaucratic-authoritarian and societal policy 
making entails a reset and reform in FSP in Turkey. 
Two traditions in policy making face deep running 
problems of their own beside their dialectical engage-
ment against each other on determination of the course 
of FSP in Turkey. To accommodate the conflicting 
views on FSP making, a sober reevaluation of Turkish 
national interests should be a priority. In a contempo-
rary fashion, Turkey needs to act as a performing state 
and espouse the best practices of good governance. The 
former is about providing security and public goods, 
the latter is about transparency, accountability, and 
pluralism. Turkish policymakers cannot confine their 
immediate goals to providing the first and shelving the 
latter for sunnier days. As the nonliteral clash of state 
and societal powers in recent history exemplifies, there 
is a proven direct correlation between good govern-
ance and state power that must be struck in order to 
lead a country. These principles are also valid for FSP 
making. Without state power, the rhetorical ability 
to perpetuate the ultimate Turkish goals of security 
and prosperity is nil. Lacking good governance and 
the public support for and sustainability of policy will 
merely prove successful in achieving short-term goals.  
These goals are also a call to reinvigorate institutional 
setup, public-private partnership, and the extension 
of stakeholders in foreign policy among civil society, 
academia, and relevant societal groups. Turkey cannot 
waive its earlier commitment to the societal-pluralist 
paradigm in foreign policy: the Pandora’s box has 
already been open. Beyond the current emergency 
rule, Turkish society is ripe for participation in poli-
cymaking and would welcome its own reinstatement 
as an FSP stakeholder. This, more than ever, entails 
rebuilding state institutions with academic and soci-
etal feedback. Turkey needs division of labor, expertise, 
multidisciplinary approaches, and representation 
of multiculturalism in foreign policy. Diversifying 
sources of policymaking would broaden public support 
and would also put up a barrier against taking narrow-
minded and one-sided approaches in Turkey’s FSP. 
A blend of academic, societal, and pluralistic input 
would enrich Turkish FSP and build a much-needed 
organic link with its neighborhood. However, it is only 
if Turkish foreign and security institutions make the 
most of this pluralism that Turkey can live up to its 
desired role as a muscular regional power.
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